In democratic elections, constituents may view unconventional or non-prototypical candidates as attempting to reshape their national identity in the wrong direction. When a non-prototypical candidate actually steps into a leadership role, the group's consensual view of their prototype may shift to position this new leader as prototypical. This process should be bound in member consensus, evidenced by the leader's successful election. The current work examines American Republicans (N = 297) and Democrats (N = 322) before and after the 2016 US election. We focus on Republicans' interpretations of their candidate Donald Trump's prototypicality and ability to bolster or subvert their party identity pre-election. Post-election, we examine changes to these processes, related in part to Republicans' homogenized view of Trump's prototypicality. In comparison, we examine these processes in the Democratic Party. Results suggest that whereas Democrats increased in their desire to leave their party, Republicans decreased in their desire to leave their party, an effect that is related to increasing perceptions of Trump's prototypicality and representation of the Republican Party. These findings have important implications for how the contexts of elections rapidly shape party identity through the election of leaders such as Trump.
In democratic elections, constituents may view unconventional or non-prototypical candidates as attempting to reshape their national identity in the wrong direction. When a non-prototypical candidate actually steps into a leadership role, the group's consensual view of their prototype may shift to position this new leader as prototypical. This process should be bound in member consensus, evidenced by the leader's successful election. The current work examines American Republicans (N = 297) and Democrats (N = 322) before and after the 2016 US election. We focus on Republicans' interpretations of their candidate Donald Trump's prototypicality and ability to bolster or subvert their party identity pre-election. Post-election, we examine changes to these processes, related in part to Republicans' homogenized view of Trump's prototypicality. In comparison, we examine these processes in the Democratic Party. Results suggest that whereas Democrats increased in their desire to leave their party, Republicans decreased in their desire to leave their party, an effect that is related to increasing perceptions of Trump's prototypicality and representation of the Republican Party. These findings have important implications for how the contexts of elections rapidly shape party identity through the election of leaders such as Trump.
National elections often spark quick national and global changes. For example, when the United Kingdom elected the Conservatives as their governing party in 1979, its leader and the country's new Prime Minister promptly implemented new and controversial economic policies that had an almost immediate impact on the UK's economy (e.g., lowering inflation, increasing unemployment, and an economic recession; Elliott, 2013) . In a different manner, shortly after Hungarians voted in Fidesz as their ruling party, the new Prime Minister, Viktor Orb an, declared and enforced major changes to the Hungarian constitution, which has doubtlessly changed Hungarian society (see Lendvai, 2017) . Election results can usher in significant change through a process of strong-arming and changing constitutions, but also through a shift in policy and even changes to societal factors and political identifications. Newly elected leadership can push policy change, but also social and political identity changes. What it means to be a political participant or even a member of a particular nation can hinge on the leader the populace chooses to represent them to the world, particularly in the case of elected leaders who deviate drastically from their predecessors and seek to upend norms and/or traditions.
The current political climate in the United States provides one such example of a nation's leader dramatically contesting long-standing norms (e.g., promoting a warmer relationship with Russia in the face of Russian attempts to influence US elections). Despite these departures, Trump's approval rating among members of his own party is 90% (Gallup, 2018a) . Moreover, there appears to be a shift, at least among Republicans, in their views of Russia. In 2014, 22% of Republicans reported that Russia was an ally of the United States, whereas in 2018, 40% of Republicans view Russia as an ally (Gallup, 2018b) .
The current work posits that election results may provide a consensual understanding of group identity in political parties. The results of a democratic election can inform partisans about what most members of their political party feel about policy and even leadership, and as a result can help to solidify what people view is prototypical of their party. Thus, the process of electing a leader may create a sense of sharedness with respect to a newly elected leader's prototypicality. This shared perception of the leader's prototypicality should be demonstrated not only in an increase in the extent to which partisans view their leader as prototypical after the leader moves from candidate or nominee to newly elected leader, but also in a decrease in the heterogeneity surrounding perceptions of the new leader's prototypicality. Greater homogeneity (agreement) around leader prototypicality would suggest that the new leader is viewed as more representative of the party's identity and is perhaps even what is prototypical of the party the leader represents. The current work examines political identity and leadership processes pre-and post-election of Donald Trump in the United States to examine the extent to which Republicans are indeed trending towards becoming the 'Party of Trump' (as former House Speaker John Boehner claimed on 31 May 2018; see Stracqualursi, 2018) .
Democratically elected leaders ideally provide a clear representation of the will of their electorate. They represent the attitudes, opinions, and vision of the people and are thus a physical embodiment of the ideals that link the people as a group. That is, ideal political leaders are prototypical of the groups that they represent -they possess both the attributes that define the group identity and the idealistic qualities that allow the group identity to prosper (Steffens et al., 2014) . In this paper, we argue that because the democratic electoral process, to some extent, is built on the electorate's consensus regarding a candidate's ability to represent a nation or a political party, perceptions of the candidate's prototypicality may increase after a successful election. That is, the election of a candidate may highlight a shared representation of the leader's prototypicality, evidenced in homogenized perceptions of the leader's embodiment of the group identity. Here, we use the 2016 US presidential election of Donald Trump to examine group identity change as it relates to elected leadership. We also consider the 2016 defeat of Hillary Clinton and the Democrats to highlight how perceived loss of leadership and representation may affect political party identity and subsequent motivation to exit or schism from the party. This specific election presents an example in which party identity may change rapidly due to perceived changes in leadership and representation. Whereas Republicans gained in terms of federal representation with the election of their candidate, Democrats lost. This likely altered the way in which Republicans and Democrats view not only their party's prototype, but also their relationship with American society. A Republican vote for Trump was rewarded with a victory, yet his victory also potentially provided the perception that Republican support for Trump and his vision is shared in the Republican Party -that there is consensus among Republicans that Trump represents their party -legitimizing him as their leader and bestowing him with the ability to direct what it means to be an American conservative in the era of Trump.
Elections as consensus
In the lead-up to the 2016 election, the US press covered several stories of prominent Republicans who did not support Donald Trump, including former presidents George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush. On the other hand, after the Democratic National Convention in July of 2016, Democrats appeared to embrace Hillary Clinton as their party's nominee for president. A poll of over 1,300 registered voters, taken 28 October -1 November 2016, suggests that 85% of Republicans polled viewed their party as divided, whereas only 25% of Democrats polled viewed their party as divided (Martin, Sussman, & Thee-Brenan, 2016) . Before the election, it is likely that Republicans did not believe that their party had achieved consensus in their belief that Donald Trump as their candidate could adequately represent their party's identity, particularly considering his involvement in several scandals that could cast their party in an unfavourable light. Democrats, on the other hand, appeared to accept Clinton as not only their nominee for president, but also appeared to believe that she would be the next president of the United States, as most prominent presidential election forecasting websites predicted a Clinton victory over Trump in the election (see for example, 'Who Will Win the Presidency? ', 2016) .
After her loss, Democrats may have distanced themselves from Clinton as she no longer contributed positively to their party identity (e.g., Rast, Hackett, Alabastro, & Hogg, 2015) . After Trump's win, Republicans may have viewed him more favourably, and thus more representative of their party's identity. Trump's victory allowed him to both contributes positively to the Republican Party's identity and also solidified that most Republicans elected him to represent them.
Leadership and group identity
Group prototypes are cognitive constructions that best define a group in a specific social context (i.e., who is the ingroup and who is the outgroup; see, Hogg & Reid, 2006) . Perceived ingroup consensus determines what and who is group prototypical. Although intragroup agreement need not be explicit, group members typically expect that they will agree with one another with respect to ingroup normative attitudes and behaviours (see Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, & Reynolds, 1998) . Because group members tend to favourably view the prototype as an important extension of self, those members who are group prototypical tend to be liked (e.g., Hogg, 1993) and elevated to leadership positions.
Leaders who are 'one of us' command the ability to shape and influence group identities (e.g., Hogg, 2001; Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003; Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005) . The social identity approach to leadership (Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011; Hogg, 2001; Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003) views leadership as arising from processes of selfand social-categorization (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) . More specifically, group members elect and support leaders who best represent their group identity through protecting ingroup norms and helping to distinguish the ingroup from relevant and competing outgroups.
Although there are some instances in which candidates who seek to change their party's core identity win elections, historical events and laboratory research (see van Knippenberg, van Knippenberg, & Bobbio, 2008) provide evidence that a potential leader or candidate who seeks rapid change from historical party or societal norms can threaten the integrity of their group identity. For example, far-right political groups such as France's National Front, led by Marine Le Pen, and the Netherlands' Party for Freedom, led by Geert Wilders, did not win parliamentary elections in 2017 in their respective countries. How a candidate such as Donald Trump affects social identification processes in his political party (the Republican Party) could vary drastically from how Donald Trump as an elected leader affects social identification processes in the Republican Party. To many establishment Republicans, Trump as a candidate may have appeared fringe or even potentially harmful to the identity of the Republican Party, making them desire to leave the party. That is, there could have been some confusion and significant variability in the way in which Republicans viewed Trump before he was elected. However, if the results of Trump's election to president were able to demonstrate, at least to Republicans, that he has the support of the populace, many Republicans may view him as more representative of their party's prototype and thus be more likely to support their party and desire to stay in it. That is, because Trump won the election, it could have provided Republicans with a clear view of how Republicans stand with respect to Trump. Thus, the election process could have resulted in the Republican Party's shift to the 'Party of Trump', a reference to what pundits and political thinkers view as a change to the Republican Party in the direction of 'Trumpism' (see Kroll, 2018 ).
Hypothesis 1a: Republicans' perceptions of Trump's prototypicality as leader of the Republican Party will increase from pre-to post-election, whereas Democrats' perceptions of Clinton's prototypicality will remain stable from pre-to post-election.
Hypothesis 1b: Heterogeneity (variance) surrounding Republicans' perceptions of Trump's prototypicality will become homogenized from pre-to post-election, whereas the heterogeneity surrounding Democrats' perceptions of Clinton's prototypicality will remain stable.
Leadership and subversion
In general, people prefer group members who contribute positively to their group identity. Ingroup members who threaten the integrity of the group or whose behaviour calls into question the group's character or positivity of the group identity tend to receive punishment and sanctions from other group members (Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Henson, 2000) . Often, group members derogate (e.g., Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988) or exclude (e.g., Ditrich, Scholl, & Sassenberg, 2017) ingroup normative deviants; however, sometimes, an ingroup deviant can produce identity subversion (Ditrich & Sassenberg, 2016) . Identity subversion occurs when individuals or factions of a group perceive fundamental and irreconcilable changes to central aspects of the group identity (Ditrich et al., 2017; Sani, 2005; Sani & Reicher, 1998 ) and can create a desire for individuals to exit the group (e.g., Ditrich & Sassenberg, 2016) , or for factions to schism in an attempt to preserve the 'true identity' of the group (see Sani, 2005) . In practice, leaders who seek to contest group norms and, as a result, drastically change the group identity should create identity subversion that could potentially result in member exit (e.g., Ditrich et al., 2017) . Severe cases of widespread exit can result in a schism, which occurs when strongly identified group members perceive leadership as fundamentally attempting to harm or change the group (Sani & Reicher, 1998) , or perhaps even discontinue the group's true identity (Sani, 2005; Ullrich, Wieseke, & van Dick, 2005; van Knippenberg et al., 2008) . Whereas a prototypical leader may be able to champion collective action towards a consensual group identity, one who is non-prototypical, who does not stick to strict party platform ties, may actually induce identity subversion and create a subsequent desire to leave the group. Thus, candidates such as Trump, who contest group norms and attempt to disrupt tradition, might produce a desire for group members to exit their party, whereas as a fully elected leader, they might contribute positively to the party's identity. However, candidate Hillary Clinton should have contributed positively to Democrat's identity, with her politically moderate viewpoints and the belief in the inevitability of her election to presidency. Her loss, on the other hand, might signal a failure to the party identity and be related to Democrats' desire to leave the party.
Hypothesis 2: Among Republicans, intentions to exit the Republican Party will decrease from pre-to post-election of Donald Trump; however, Democrats' desire to exit the Democratic Party will increase post-election loss.
Deviance and behaviours that call into question the integrity of the ingroup can create identity subversion; however, there are instances in which group members may perceive deviance as promoting the ingroup. For example, group members tend to upgrade ingroup deviants who are effective at achieving group goals -an effect that is mediated by moral disengagement from the violated norm (Aguiar, Campos, Pinto, & Marques, 2017) . Moreover, leaders, specifically, can sometimes hold special privileges which allow them to transgress from group norms in a way that regular ingroup members and outgroup members cannot (Abrams, Randsley de Moura, & Travaglino, 2013) . We suggest that candidates who lack prototypicality (particularly if they behave in deviant ways) may negatively impact the group identity and create identity subversion and a subsequent desire to schism. However, elected leaders who originally lack prototypicality may be able to overcome their non-prototypical position by means of shifts in consensus surrounding their prototypicality. Some Grand Old Party (GOP -another name for the Republican Party) members may continue to find Trump as unrepresentative of their identity, and thus, his presence as their leader should subvert their identity (see for example a former GOP strategist's views on Trumpism harming the GOP; Kroll, 2018) and predict a subsequent desire to exit the party. However, among those who now view Trump as prototypical of the Republican Party, perceptions of his prototypicality should negatively predict their desire to exit the party, in part, because he is viewed as bolstering (rather than subverting) their identity.
Hypothesis 3: Republicans' perceptions that Trump subverts their party's identity will mediate the relationship between shifts in perceptions of Trump's prototypicality from preto post-election and Republicans' desire to exit the Republican Party. However, as Clinton may no longer be a source for constructing Democrats' perceptions of party identity and prototypicality post-election, we do not expect this relationship to exist amongst Democrats. Given previous literature (e.g., Sani, 2005) , the extent to which partisans perceive each leader as subverting their identity should predict partisans' willingness to leave their party.
Overview of the research
This work uses survey data obtained from American voters during and after the 2016 US presidential election to examine how group identities change as a function of changes in leadership. More specifically, this work uses time-lagged data obtained from Democrats and Republicans at two time points: 14-21 days prior to the election and within 30 days after the election. We employed a quasi-measurement of consensus surrounding Trump's and Clinton's prototypicality in their respective parties. To examine partisans' consensus shifts from pre-to post-election, we examined changes in the variance of perceptions of each leaders' prototypicality from pre-to post-election.
Method
Participants Participants were recruited through Sample Network TM , an online marketing company that reaches a large panel of adults who complete online surveys for financial compensation. Panellists lived in the United States and indicated their political party affiliation was either Democrat or Republican. Participants completed a survey containing several questions regarding their views of the US political climate (including the survey items that we report here) 2 weeks prior to the 2016 presidential election in November of 2016. The same participants received a shorter version of this survey, which eliminated demographic questions, approximately 2 weeks after the 2016 election. Three hundred and five Democrats and 282 Republicans completed the pre-election survey and 167 Democrats and 160 Republicans completed the post-election survey (see Table 1 for details regarding participant demographics). This study was part of a larger survey project examining issues related to the 2016 presidential election. Only those measures relevant to our specific research questions are reported here.
Measures

Party affiliation
After consenting to participate in the study, participants indicated their political party (Democrat, Republican, Independent, Other -those who selected 'Independent' or 'Other' were provided compensation and exited the survey). Democrats and Republicans were directed to separate surveys that were identical in content, but worded such that they made sense for each party (e.g., Republicans completed measures which asked specifically about Trump and the Republican Party, Democrats completed measures which asked specifically about Clinton and the Democratic Party). (1 = Strongly disagree, 7 = Strongly agree) and were averaged to create a composite variable for exit (Democrat pre-election a = .97, Republican pre-election a = .93, Note.
Candidate prototypicality
a 'Other' race ethnicity for Democrats (e.g., 'Native American', 'Mixed Race') for Republicans (e.g., 'Armenian', 'Middle Eastern'). Percentages are rounded.
Democrat post-election a = .94, and Republican post-election a = .93) such that higher scores indicate greater exit intentions. See Tables 2 and 3 for correlations between variables. Because these items addressed individual level exit from the party, we use the term 'exit' here.
Demographics
Participants completed a battery of basic demographics, including self-identified gender, race/ethnicity, income bracket, and education level at the pre-election measurement only. See Table 1 .
Results
Leader prototypicality
Consensus surrounding leader prototypicality A preliminary analysis examining changes to consensus surrounding leader prototypicality addressed the basic assumption that dispersion surrounding perceptions of Trump's prototypicality in the Republican Party should homogenize from pre-to post-election, while dispersion surrounding Clinton's prototypicality in the Democratic Party should remain relatively unchanged. To address changes in the heterogeneity surrounding partisans' perceptions of their leaders' prototypicality pre-and post-election, we conducted a paired Pitman-Morgan test using the PairedData package for R. Kuppens and Yzerbyt (2014) argue that measures of variability provide a 'convenient' (p. 691) and sound way of testing for differences and changes to consensus.
As expected, there was no difference in the heterogeneity surrounding Democrats' perceptions of Clinton's prototypicality from pre-(SD = 1.51) to post-election (SD = 1.38); t(163) = 1.74, p = .08. However, Republicans' perceptions of Trump's prototypicality became more homogenous from pre-(SD = 1.72) to post-election (SD = 1.56); t(157) = 1.91, p = .05. 1 These results imply that Republicans may have 
Notes.
Top diagonal contains pre-election correlations. Subversion refers to the perception that Clinton will subvert the identity of the Democratic Party. Prototypicality refers to perceptions Clinton's prototypicality in the Democratic Party. **p < .010; ***p < .001.
1 The Pitman-Morgan test using the full sample of Republicans pre-election and post-election reveals a larger difference between variances (pre-election = 3.08; post-election = 2.43), and thus a stronger effect. However, given that the current work is examining paired scores, we report only the somewhat weaker effect of the paired scores. Note also that the standard deviations which appear in text when reporting the Pitman-Morgan analyses are the standard deviations for the paired data, whereas Tables 2 and 3 Exit A mixed-model ANOVA with exit as the repeated factor and political party (Democrats vs. Republicans) as a between-subjects factor examined changes in partisans' exit intentions as a function of whether or not their party's candidate had won or lost the 2016 presidential election. There was no between-subjects effect for political partyDemocrats and Republicans did not differ in their exit intentions, F(1, 317) = 1.04, p = .31, g p = .003. Moreover, the within-subjects effect of exit did not differ from pre-to post-election, F(1, 317) = 1.36, p = .25, g p = .004. However, Democrats' and Republicans' exit intentions differed from one another as a function of pre-to post-election measurement, F(1, 317) = 39.34, p < .001, g p = .11. Simple effects tests revealed that Democrats increased in exit intentions from pre-(M = 2.03, SD = 1.50) to post-election, M = 2.58, SD = 1.65; F(1, 317) = 27.57, p < .001. Republicans, on the other hand, decreased in exit intentions from pre-(M = 2.34, SD = 1.50) to post-election, M = 1.96, SD = 1.47; F(1, 317) = 13.08, p < .001. Whereas Republicans were only slightly higher in exit intentions at pre-election than Democrats; F(1, 317) = 3.32, p = .07, at post-election, Democrats were higher in exit intentions than Republicans; F(1, 317) = 12.60, p < .001. See Tables 2 and 3 . See also, Figure 2 .
Prototypicality and exit
To examine how changing perceptions of Trump's prototypicality from pre-to postelection contribute to the Republican Party's identity, we conducted a mediation analysis using Hayes' (2012) PROCESS macro, Model 4 with 5,000 bootstrapped iterations with identity subversion as a potential mediator of the relationship between post-election perceptions of Trump's prototypicality and desire to exit the Republican Party (controlling for pre-election perceptions of Trump's prototypicality to make use of the longitudinal nature of data). The direct effect of post-election perceptions of Trump's prototypicality on exit was not significant (b = À.12, SE b = .10, 95% CI = À0.32, 0.09). However, the indirect effect was significant (Indirect Effect = À.14, SE boot = .07, 95% Boot CI = À0.31, À0.02), indicating full mediation. Controlling for pre-election perceptions of prototypicality, post-election perceptions of Trump's prototypicality negatively predicted identity subversion (b = À.35, SE b = .13, 95% CI = À0.61, À0.10), which in turn positively predicted desire to exit the Republican Party (b = .39, SE b = .06, 95% CI = 0.26, 0.51). That is, increasing perceptions of Trump's prototypicality predicted less desire to leave the Republican Party, through decreasing perceptions of Trump subverting the identity of the party. See Figure 3 . To provide evidence that these effects are not simply a function of time and give some confidence in the assertion that these changes reflect the changing nature of the Republican Party based on significant changes in leadership due to the election of Donald Trump, we examined the same model in Democrats. As expected, subversion did not mediate the relationship between Democrats' perceptions of Clinton's prototypicality and their desire to exit the party (Indirect Effect = .08, SE boot = À0.27, 95% Boot CI = À0.26, 0.16).
Discussion
The results suggest that Republicans decreased in exit intentions from pre-to postelection, whereas Democrats increased in exit intentions. Moreover, Republicans' perceptions of Trump's prototypicality increased after he won the election and became the 45th president of the United States. Importantly, it appears that Republicans' perceptions of Trump's prototypicality (but not Democrats' perceptions of Clinton's) converged from pre-to post-election, becoming more homogenous, and potentially indicating greater sharedness in their conceptualization of Trump's prototypicality. It appears that Republicans coalesced around Trump's ability to represent the nature of the Republican Party's prototype after his victory. Group members may view non-prototypical candidates as misinterpreting or attempting to reshape the group identity in the wrong direction (Sani & Reicher, 1998) . The current work examines these processes in the context of the US 2016 presidential election, in which Donald Trump primarily ran on a platform that presented him as a nonprototypical Republican. For many 'traditional' Republicans, Trump likely posed a threat to the integrity of their identity and caused identity subversion. Clinton, on the other hand, ran her candidacy under the banner of a prototypical Democrat, who sought to protect her party's ideals. Her message may have bolstered and supported many Democrats' identities, as witnessed in our pre-election findings among Democrats. However, postelection, these results suggest that the victor, Trump, also gained in terms of his prototypicality as a Republican, a finding that appears to rest in convergence around his prototypicality.
When an important social identity is salient, group members seek normative clarity and important information about ingroup prototypicality from members that embody the group's prototype (e.g., Haslam, Oakes, McGarty, Turner, & Onorato, 1995) . As a result, members who closely approximate the ingroup prototype tend to capture other group members' attention and become powerful agents of influence within the group (see Hogg & Reid, 2001) . Because prototypical group members serve as referent points for normative attitudes and behaviours, they tend to wield influence within the group (see Gaffney & Hogg, 2017) . Given their special status, prototypical members and leaders have a unique ability to communicate what is normative to other group members and can thus effectively shift group norms and construct the group's prototype around their own features, further establishing and promoting their own prototypicality (e.g., Hogg & Reid, 2006) . Prototypical leaders can thus be 'entrepreneurs of identity' (Reicher & Hopkins, 2003) , shaping and moulding what is group prototypical by focusing specifically on the group identity and the leader's ability to be representative of it.
An increase in Trump's perceived prototypicality among Republicans should have significant ramifications for the newly elected leader's ability to change her or his party from the inside of the political system. Group members tend to overlook group prototypical leaders' failures and tend to rate prototypical leaders as more effective than non-prototypical leaders even after they fail, because members trust prototypical leaders to guard the group identity (Giessner, van Knippenberg, & Sleebos, 2009) .
The tendency to converge around a newly elected leader's prototypicality should hinge on perceptions of group consensus around what is group prototypical. Consensus might not have been present before the election took place, particularly if the leader, as a candidate, actively contested the party on important aspects of group identity. The actual presentation of election results likely provides a source of referent informational influence (e.g., for partisans by providing them information about their party's prototype through descriptive data about how members of their group voted. This opens party identity to the potential of rapid change through the election of a leader from the outside of the political system, one who may have originally lacked prototypicality within the party or politics in general.
When a non-prototypical group member actually steps into a leadership position, the group's consensual view of their prototype may shift to position this new leader at the group's core. Abrams, Randsley de Moura, Marques, and Hutchison (2008) provide evidence that group members grant future leaders 'innovation credit' -leeway to deviate from current group norms. However, they suggest that leaders generally 'have a guaranteed position and power' (p. 664), whereas Trump was not guaranteed a leadership position before 8 November 2016. Up until he was elected as the 45th president of the United States, he held outsider status without the guarantee of a leadership position within the Republican Party or the United States. Whereas the candidate's lack of fit may produce feelings of identity subversion and subsequently a desire for members to exit the group, the new leader may now have the ability to shape and effectively attenuate such feelings. This process should be bound in member consensus, evidenced in the leader's election. In sum, in the context of a democratic election, actually stepping into the role of national leader transforms the group and/or party's perceptions of the new leader. This idea appears to be supported in the finding that post-election, Republicans' exit intentions decreased and they also perceived Trump as more representative of their party than they did before the election. This is important for demonstrating how the election process can quickly change the nature of political identities and prompt social and political change. Leaders such as Hungary's Viktor Orb an and China's Xi Jinping quickly endorsed and enacted changes to their country's constitutions, demonstrating the great power that national leaders hold in their countries. When groups change, members can view themselves as changing along with the group. Those who view themselves as different from the new representation of the group may opt to leave the party. In either situation, parties change and thus the policies they push and the causes they support will doubtlessly follow suit.
Implications
The current work uses the US political climate to explore potential leadership as a tipping point for schism and new leadership as a vehicle for constructing collective consensus and highlights implications for identity factors that drive group change. Although this work focuses specifically on the political identities of American partisans, these findings may reach beyond the US political system where elections and their legitimacy are deciding factors in representatives and the policy and change those leaders push.
Changes to the way in which people view their leaders' prototypicality represent changes to the way in which people perceive their group's prototype (see Gaffney & Hogg, 2017) . In the case of Republicans converging agreement regarding on Trump's prototypicality within the Republican Party, Republicans are demonstrating that their prototype is changing in a direction that allows their new leader to be representative of their identity. Given Trump's nationalistic rhetoric of 'America First' and his particular brand of disregard for 'political correctness', it is important to consider that Republicans may be open to allowing Trump to rebrand their party in his image and support him on a variety of policy issues. Indeed, perceptions of opinion consensus in one's political party predict partisans' collective self-efficacy in politics and thus their desire to engage in action on behalf of their party (Stern, West, Jost, & Rule, 2014) . Some of the rhetoric that President Donald Trump has used to describe certain groups and nations (e.g., he was quoted referring to some African nations as 'shithole' countries) marks a drastic departure from rhetoric employed by his predecessors. Sadly, the Southern Poverty Law Center has reported that hate crimes and hate groups gathering in public spaces have increased in the United States after the election of Donald Trump. Between 2015 and 2016, the number of anti-Muslim hate groups in the United States nearly tripled (Potok, 2017) .
Given that these processes are a product of the way in which partisans interpret their identities with respect to leadership, we would not expect that all people in a nation would shift towards their new leader's vision for the group. In fact, the election of Trump may have actually created a sense of superordinate identity subversion for some Democrats, causing them to disidentify with the nation as a whole because their group categorically did not support Trump (see Hohman, Hogg, & Bligh, 2010) . Nor would we expect that individuals who strongly opposed 'Brexit' will now come to support it after witnessing the UK's election results. Those who strongly opposed 'Brexit' likely construct their identities in opposition to those who supported it and the results from that election only serve to stress the division between those who voted for it and those who did not.
Limitations and future directions These findings are bound in a specific historical and political context. As witnessed in differences from before to after the election, the ways in which people construct their political identities may alter with respect to leadership and historical changes. Because the work presented here is correlational in nature, we cannot claim causal mechanisms. Future work can and will explore the presentation of election information as a form of consensus in experimental paradigms. Our goal here is to provide a snapshot of the changing nature of political identities and how leadership plays a crucial role in that change. Although this work provides a novel way of examining perceived consensus around a leader's prototypicality, there was no direct measure of perceived consensus. Future work will directly test explicit perceptions of consensus; however, the technique provided here provides a quasi-measurement of actual consensus surrounding a political leader's perceived prototypicality in the form of dispersion of responses.
This work examined leader prototypicality as representation, but this is only one part of prototypicality. More than just being the average group member, prototypical leaders engage in identity advancement. This provides group members a sense that the leader works on behalf of the group (Steffens et al., 2014) . This concept of a leader 'doing it for us' (Steffens et al., 2014, p. 1) helps to mobilize followers. Identity advancement as a key process of prototypicality is likely an important part of the appeal of leaders such as Trump who purport to create drastic policy and social change on behalf of those who support him.
Leadership can become a tipping point for group and societal level changes. People give their leaders the leeway to shape group norms, particularly if those leaders can at least rhetorically assure their followers that they can promote the continuity of their group's vision and identity. The communication of group norms through the electoral process may help to solidify a new leader's position as deserving of pushing change to her or his party, group, or nation. For positive social change or regressive policy that stifles diversity and growth, electorates provide new governing leaders with a platform from which to guide and shape the future.
